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Abstract
This article is designed to offer an overview of the major events and policy issues
related to Arts 81, 82 and 86 EC in 2004–2005. The article follows the format of
previous years and is divided into three sections: — A general overview of ma-
jor events (legislation and notices, European Court cases, European Commission
decisions, ECN developments and new sector inquiries). — Discussion of current
policy issues, including cartel enforcement, private actions and Art.82 EC mod-
ernisation. — An outline of certain areas of specific interest, notably competition
and the liberal professions, the Commission’s “Sport and 3G” review and a DG
COMP paper on competition and waste management.
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This article is designed to offer an overview of the
major events and policy issues related to Arts 81,
82 and 86 EC in 2004–2005.
The article follows the format of previous years
and is divided into three sections:
— A general overview of major events (legis-
lation and notices, European Court cases,
European Commission decisions, ECN
developments and new sector inquiries).
— Discussion of current policy issues, includ-
ing cartel enforcement, private actions and
Art.82 EC modernisation.
— An outline of certain areas of specific
interest, notably competition and the liberal
professions, the Commission’s ‘‘Sport and
3G’’ review and a DG COMP paper on
competition and waste management.
Legislation, European Court judgments and Euro-
pean Commission cartel cases are included in
Part 1. The other sections will be included in
Part 2, published in the next issue of I.C.C.L.R.
Major themes of the year
This has not been a dramatic year in terms of
EC competition law enforcement. If anything, it
appears to have been rather quiet in the Euro-
pean Commission: with a new Commissioner, Mrs
Kroes, and a number of cases with important tech-
nical points, but few headline-catching antitrust
*Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Brussels.
With many thanks to Ingrid Cloosterin for her general
help in the production of this article. The reference period
is from November 2004 until the end of October 2005.
This article does not cover merger control.
Box 1
• Major Themes in 2005
— Cartels
* Many old decisions
* A dedicated ‘‘Cartel Directorate’’
* Plea bargaining to come?
— Modernisation/Decentralised enforcement
* ‘‘Commitment decisions’’
(Bundesliga/Coca-Cola)
* Old ‘‘(national)’’ cases now ‘‘ECN EC’’ cases
* A ‘‘collective approach’’ to enforcement
— New Sectoral Reviews
* Energy, payment cards, insurance
decisions. However, clearly we are still in a transi-
tional phase, after so much activity in modernising
and expanding the enforcement system into that
of a European Competition Network (‘‘ECN’’) of 26
EU competition authorities. As the Commission is
noting, it may also be more correct to measure
results not just by the Commission’s activities, but
by the collective result of all the ECN authorities
and national court decisions.
The biggest antitrust issues of the year in the
European Commission’s activities appear to be:
— Cartel enforcement, with many of the older
decisions published and ideas to deal
with the large number of cases which the
Commission has in progress.
— The new modernised and decentralised
enforcement system, as the ECN gets going,
with the first Commission commitment
decisions.
— The Commission’s launch of the two new
sectoral reviews, one for energy and another
for financial services, including retail bank-
ing, payment cards and insurance.
Overview of major events
Legislative developments (adopted and
proposed)
Box 2
• Legislation/Notices
— Small amendments to shipping block exemption
— Discussion about IATA block exemption
— Location clauses no longer covered by MVBE
— New fining guidelines?
— Access to File Notice caught up in VKI/Regulation
1049/2001 debate
— Damages and Art.82 EC papers coming
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Adopted
Amended shipping block exemption
In April 2005 the Commission renewed the
Liner Shipping Consortium Block Exemption
Regulation 823/2000 until 2010, with some
small modifications.1 Under this regulation all
agreements whose objective is the joint operation
of liner shipping services are exempted from
Art.81 EC, provided that they meet the relevant
market share and other criteria. The exemption
does not apply to price-fixing, or to the transport
of passengers.2 The modifications are that:
— A consortium member can be required not
to withdraw from a consortium for a period
of 24 months (instead of 18). In other
words, consortia must allow members to
give notice of withdrawal without financial
penalty after 18 months, such notice to be a
maximum of six months.
— A consortium member can also be required
not to withdraw for 24 months, if the
members have agreed on substantial new
investment in consortium services (i.e.
when an investment constitutes at least
half of the total investment made by
the consortium members). This may be
increased up to 36 months in the event of
a highly integrated consortium, with a net
revenue pool and a high level of specific
investment.
— ‘‘Individual confidential contracts’’ by con-
sortium members (as well as independent
rate action) may now also be considered in
order to assess the existence of ‘‘effective
price competition’’, one of the conditions of
the block exemption.
The Commission is still reviewing Council
Regulation 4056/86 as part of its campaign to
persuade the EU Member States to change it.3
Car block exemption
On October 1, 2005, so-called ‘‘location clauses’’,
requiring dealers only to operate from defined
locations, ceased to be covered by the Motor
Vehicle Block Exemption, Regulation 1400/2002.4
Dealers still have to comply with the quality stan-
dards applicable where the secondary outlet will
be established. The idea is that car manufacturers
1. Commission Regulation 611/2005 [2005] O.J.
L101/10; Commission Press Release IP/05/477, April 25,
2005.
2. The Commission has also published on its website a
report written by the European Liner Affairs Association
dated March 2005.
3. See last year’s review [2005] I.C.C.L.R. 47 at p.55. The
submissions received by the Commission in relation to
its ‘‘White Paper’’ are now published on its website.
4. IP/05/1208, September 30, 2005.
will deliver to the dealer’s primary outlet (unless
the agreement provides otherwise) and the pur-
chasing conditions and sales targets remain those
applicable to that location. It will be interest-
ing to see what happens now, notably to what
extent dealers will think that there are gaps in the
network, justifying secondary outlets.
The Commission has stated that, in principle,
car manufacturers can still include location
clauses, which are not ‘‘hard core’’ restrictions, if
they can show on a specific, individual basis that
the positive benefits of the clause would outweigh
any negative effects. However, most think this is
unlikely to occur in practice.
The Commission’s enforcement focus is cur-
rently on access to technical information for inde-
pendent car repairers, in which area there are four
investigations.5
Proposed
IATA block exemption review
In March 2005 the Commission published a
discussion paper on whether the IATA passenger
tariff conferences should continue to be exempted
from Art.81 EC. This discussion has been
going on for some time now, with the airlines
arguing that it is necessary to discuss prices
for scheduled passenger flights in order to
organise interlining. The Commission has been
questioning whether such issues justify a block
exemption (like Commission Regulation 1617/93),
or whether, through the development of more
alliances between air carriers and code-sharing
arrangements, the block exemption is no longer
required.6
New fining guidelines?
It appears that the Commission is currently
considering revised fining guidelines.
It is understood that they may look somewhat
different from the 1998 Guidelines, in particular
since the Commission is now thinking about plea
bargaining (understood to mean that companies
would agree their level of fine). Some argue that
for such purposes more predictable guidelines are
required, so that would-be plea bargainers can
know what is the maximum fine that they may
face.
It will be interesting to see if the Commission
will clarify the starting amount assessment and
5. See comments of Messrs Mehta and Cesarini at the
IBC Conference on the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption,
October 5, 2005.
6. IP/05/289, March 14, 2005. An earlier consultation
paper from 2004 and the responses received are on
the Commission’s website. Just after this paper was
completed the Commission announced that it planned
to revise the IATA block exemption with a view to
its ‘‘discontinuation’’ by June 2008; see IP/05/1432 and
MEMO/05/430, November 16, 2005.
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deterrence increases, since these are the most
difficult to assess in practice.
Otherwise, one may expect changes to allow
for lower fines for smaller companies and cartels,
since this is another area of difficulty, especially
in cases involving small markets and/or cartels in
the smaller EU Member States.
New access notice?
In October 2004, the Commission published a new
draft notice on access to file.7 However, this has
not yet been finalised. One senses that this may be
because of the controversial issue of information
access under the Transparency Regulation after
the VKI judgment (discussed below).
Other?
There are a number of discussion papers in the
pipeline. Notably:
— A ‘‘Green Paper’’ on private enforcement
of Arts 81 and 82 EC. Apparently, this is
being discussed with Member States and
may come early next year.
— Possible guidelines on Art.82 EC enforce-
ment. Again, it appears that these are being
discussed with Member States and are
expected to come early next year for con-
sultation.
European Court cases (ECJ and CFI)
General cases
Access to file and the Transparency
Regulation
In April 2005 in VKI v Commission,8 the CFI
gave an important judgment on the access of third
7. See last year’s summary, fn.3 above, at pp.54–55.
8. Case T–2/03, judgment of April 13, 2005.
parties to the Commission’s file in cartel cases
under Regulation 1049/2001.9
The context was the Austrian Banks cartel case,
concerning the so-called ‘‘Lombard Club’’.10 The
VKI is a consumer organisation which has the right
to bring proceedings to assert the financial claims
of consumers which have been assigned to it. The
VKI is conducting proceedings against BAWAG,
one of the banks involved in the case, claiming
that the bank jointly fixed the interest rates for
certain investments and loans and therefore that
BAWAG charged its customers too much interest
on variable interest loans for a number of years.
In that context, the VKI sought access to the
Commission’s administrative file in the ‘‘Lom-
bard Club’’ decision (save for internal docu-
ments), relying among other things on Regulation
1049/2001. The Commission rejected that request
in its entirety. The VKI then confirmed its request
(as the procedure under Regulation 1049/2001
provides). The Commission responded with a
decision confirming its rejection of VKI’s request.
In that decision the Commission divided the doc-
uments in the file into internal documents and 11
other categories and explained which of the excep-
tions under Regulation 1049/2001 it considered to
apply for each category, without there being any
overriding public interest in disclosure. The Com-
mission also explained that ‘‘partial access’’ (i.e.
to part of a document) and detailed examination
of each document was not feasible because there
were some 47,000 pages in the file. The Commis-
sion considered that this represented an excessive
and disproportionate amount of work.
It may be recalled that the main exceptions
to access under Art.4 of Regulation 1049/2001
are: where the disclosure of documents would
be contrary to privacy and the integrity of the
individual; or where disclosure would undermine
9. [2001] O.J. L145/43.
10. See [2005] I.C.C.L.R. 109 at pp.112–113.
Box 3
• Main European Court cases—general
— VKI v Commission
* Need for a ‘‘concrete, individual assessment’’ of Regulation 1049/2001 requests
and exceptions (47,000 pages!)
— max.mobil
* ECJ holds that no right to judicial review of Commission decision not to bring proceedings under Art.86(3)
EC against Member States
— Syfait
* Greek Competition Commission cannot refer questions to ECJ under Art.234 EC
* Maybe true for all other NCAs?
— DaimlerChrysler
* German car agents not independent; did not take the risk of the sale
* Behaviour therefore unilateral
* Bulk of fine overturned
— Sumitomo/Sumika
* Commission must justify a decision to find an infringement after limitation period on fines expires
(Microsoft interim order not granted; Piau football agent complaint correctly rejected.)
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the protection of commercial interests, court
proceedings and legal advice, or the purpose
of inspections, investigations and audits, unless
there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
The VKI appealed, primarily arguing that
the Commission could not refuse access to
the administrative file in such a blanket way,
without having first actually examined each of the
documents contained in the file.
The CFI agreed with the VKI. The court found
that where an EU institution receives a request for
access under Regulation 1049/2001, it is required
in principle, to carry out a concrete, individual
assessment of the content of the documents
referred to in the request, in order to assess the
extent to which an exception to the right of access
is applicable, or whether partial access should
be given. The court stated that this may not be
required in cases where, owing to the particular
circumstances of the case, it is obvious that access
must be refused or granted.11 Such an individual
examination could also be avoided where the
administrative burden of such an examination
would be unreasonable and particularly heavy,
but such cases should be exceptional and only
after all other conceivable options had been
considered.12
In practice, the court found that the exceptions
relied on by the Commission did not necessarily
apply to the whole Lombard Club file and
that, even where they might apply, they might
concern only certain passages in documents.
The Commission relied partly on the exception
that disclosure would undermine the protection
of inspections and investigations, suggesting
that disclosure would be detrimental both to
leniency co-operation and responses to requests
for information.13 However, this was not accepted
by the court. As a result the Commission was
obliged to examine each of the documents referred
to in the request to see whether any exceptions
applied or whether partial access was possible.
Clearly, this ruling may have major practical
consequences for both those dealing with the
Commission, whether as a party to a case or as
a third party and the Commission itself. It is
understood that the Commission is now doing
the more specific assessment.
Article 86 EC complaints
In February 2005, the ECJ set aside the CFI’s
judgment in the max.mobil14 case. It may be
recalled that in 1997 max.mobil, the second
11. fn.8 above, at [75].
12. ibid., at [102]–[115].
13. ibid., at [81].
14. Case C–141/02P, judgment of February 22, 2005.
With thanks to Lisa Arsenidou for her assistance. See
also Hocepied (Spring 2005)ECCommission Competition
Policy Newsletter 53–56.
GSM operator in Austria, had complained to the
Commission that the Austrian authorities had
unlawfully conferred advantages on Mobilkom,
its state-owned competitor, in the allocation
of frequencies and by not charging different
concession fees to the two companies contrary
to what was then Art.90 EC (now Art.86 EC). The
Commission rejected the complaint.
On appeal, somewhat controversially, the CFI
ruled that max.mobil was entitled to bring an
action against the Commission’s decision, argu-
ing that there were differences in the Commis-
sion’s position under Art.90(3) EC and its general
infringement proceedings against Member States
under what was Art.169 EC (now Art.226 EC).
Notably, Art.169 EC states that the Commis-
sion ‘‘may’’ commence infringement proceedings,
whereas Art.90(3) EC (now Art.86(3) EC) provides
that the Commission ‘‘is to adopt the appropri-
ate measures where necessary’’. The court also
appeared influenced by the lack of redress for
individuals in such situations, noting that the
right to judicial review is a fundamental right. The
CFI then found on the substance that max.mobil’s
application was unfounded.
The Commission appealed against the finding
of admissibility and won. The ECJ decided that the
Commission is required to ensure that Member
States comply with their duties under Art.90
EC (now Art.86 EC) and can take directives and
decisions to that end. However, the Commission
was not obliged to bring proceedings against
Member States in such cases. An individual could
not oblige the Commission to take a position in
a specific sense.15 An individual might have a
‘‘direct and individual interest’’ in annulment of
a Commission refusal to act on its complaint,
but that was not enough to entitle the individual
to challenge the decision.16 Such decisions of
the Commission were therefore not amenable to
judicial review.
Microsoft interim measures
In December 2004, the President of the CFI
dismissed Microsoft’s application to suspend the
remedy orders imposed in the Commission’s
Art.82 EC decision last year.17
It will be recalled that the Commission had
found that Microsoft had abused its dominant
position through two types of conduct:
— First, Microsoft had refused to supply
information to competitors which would
allow them to develop and distribute
products competing with Microsoft’s own
products on the work group server operating
15. Case C–141/02P, fn.14 above, at [69].
16. ibid., at [70]–[72].
17. Case T–201/04R, Order of December 22, 2004.
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system market and make these products
interoperable with Microsoft’s system from
October 1998.18
— Secondly, Microsoft had tied the supply
of Windows Media Player to its windows
PC operating system from May 1999, pre-
venting competition from other ‘‘streaming’’
media playing systems.
As a result, the Commission fined Microsoft some
¤497 million and required Microsoft to implement
two main remedies: first, to make available the
information required for such interoperability and
secondly to market its Windows PCs without
Media Player installed (although Microsoft could
still offer a combined product in parallel).19
All of this is hugely controversial, partly
because it involves Microsoft, which virtually all
of us now use in our PCs, and partly because there
are some fundamental issues. Notably, on the tying
issue is it not normal and reasonable progress for
a company, even if it is dominant, to develop its
product and offer new features? Put very broadly,
the Commission’s answer to that is ‘‘no, not if
that means that all competition in the markets for
those products is foreclosed’’, and it found that
is the case here, where Microsoft is so hugely
dominant in the underlying PC operating system.
The interoperability issue is equally contested, if
only because any case of compulsory licensing
of IP rights is controversial, even though this can
only happen in exceptional circumstances on the
case law.
Microsoft has appealed the Commission’s
decision and, with it, applied for an order
suspending these remedy requirements. As a
result, the Commission agreed not to enforce the
remedies pending the order of the President.
In order to succeed, in principle Microsoft had
to show three things as regards each remedy: first,
that its claim on appeal disclosed a prima facie
case (i.e. some point of fact or principle deserving
careful consideration). Secondly, that its claim
was urgent, in the sense that it would suffer
serious and irreparable harm if the remedies were
implemented. Thirdly, that on a weighing up of
the interests involved, suspension of the remedies
should be granted.
There are three main aspects to the President’s
order20:
18. Work group server services are basic infrastructure
services that are used by office workers in their day-to-
day work, such as sharing files stored on servers and
printers.
19. See fn.10 above, at pp.118–120.
20. See generally: Madero, Banasevic, Hermes, Huby
and Kramler (Spring 2005) EC Commission Competition
Policy Newsletter 53–58; Van Bael and Bellis, ‘‘CFI
President rejects Microsoft’s application for interim
measures’’ (2005) 43 EC Competition Law Reporter 1–4;
Vinge and Dedoo, ‘‘Microsoft v. EC: In the European
Courts’’ [2005] CRi 97–102.
First, for procedural reasons, Microsoft’s argu-
ments on TRIPs (WTO trade) aspects were not
considered. Microsoft had annexed them to its
application and had not included them suffi-
ciently in the text of the application itself.
Secondly, on the interoperability issue, the
President focused on three main questions21:
(1) The question as to whether, for a refusal
to supply information protected by IP
rights to be abuse of dominant position,
the conditions of IMS Health had to be
met or whether the Commission could
find an abuse in other circumstances. In
other words, were the conditions in IMS
Health ‘‘necessary’’ for a finding of abuse,
or merely ‘‘sufficient’’?
(2) The question whether the nature of the
protected information had to be taken into
account and whether the value of the
information mattered.
(3) The question whether the requirements of
IMS Health were met. Notably, whether
the interoperability information to be dis-
closed was indispensable (to competition)
and whether the refusal was objectively jus-
tified.
He concluded that there were arguments which
needed detailed examination and that there was a
prima facie case.
However, the President was more critical of
Microsoft’s claims that it would suffer ‘‘severe
and irreparable harm’’ from the disclosure of
the interoperability information. In particular,
Microsoft had not shown that disclosure of the
‘‘alleged’’ IP in question would cause such harm
in itself. The harm requirement could only be
met if the effect of the disclosure on Microsoft’s
IP rights would cause serious and irreparable
harm over and above the simple breach of
Microsoft’s IP rights. The President also noted
that Microsoft could still impose contractual
restrictions and safeguards to prevent use of its IP,
if its appeal were successful. The President also
found that Microsoft had not clearly established
that the disclosures required would reveal more
about Microsoft’s systems. He emphasised that
Microsoft had not shown that it would not be
able to resume its ‘‘initial’’ business policy if it
succeeded on appeal. Nor was he satisfied that
such disclosure would lead to an irreversible
development of market conditions.
Thirdly, on tying aspects, the President again
focused on three main questions22:
(1) Whether the way Windows Media Player
is installed in so many operating systems,
21. fn.17 above, at [206]–[216].
22. ibid., at [390] et seq.
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giving it general ‘‘ubiquity’’, would lead
content providers and applications manu-
facturers to design their products on the
basis of Windows Media Player, creating
‘‘indirect network effects’’ which would
‘‘tip’’ the market to Microsoft. (This was
also contested by Microsoft on the facts.)
(2) Whether any positive effects from product
standardisation could amount to objective
justification or such effects should only be
accepted if they resulted from the competi-
tive process or decisions of standardisation
bodies.
(3) Whether Media Player was just a feature
or function added to the Windows PC
operating system or a distinct product,
given that Microsoft and others have
included some media functionalities in
their operating systems in the past.
Again he concluded that these were complex
questions and that a prima facie case was made
out.23
Again however, the President was more critical
of Microsoft’s arguments on ‘‘serious and irrepara-
ble harm’’. Notably, the President did not consider
that the requirement to offer a version of Windows
without Media Player would lead to irreparable
interference with Microsoft’s commercial free-
dom, nor had Microsoft shown significant effects
of the remedy likely to cause irreversible damage.
All the more so as it appeared that Microsoft did
not expect the version of Windows without Media
Player to be sold in significant quantities (because
Microsoft still planned to sell the full version with
Media Player at the same price). The Commission
also considered that the non-inclusion of Media
Player might be resolved later through an update.
In such circumstances, the President did
not proceed to the ‘‘balancing of interests’’
assessment and dismissed the application for
interim measures.
Judgment in the main action is expected in the
first half of 2006.24
Can competition authorities refer questions
to the ECJ?
In May 2005, the ECJ did not rule on the issue as to
whether a dominant company abuses that position
by only supplying what a market requires.25
23. ibid., at [394]–[404].
24. There have also been various press reports of inten-
sive discussion between Microsoft and the Commission
concerning the implementation of the remedies; and it
appears that in August 2005 Microsoft brought an appeal
on related issues, Case T–313/05 Microsoft v Commission
[2005] O.J. C257/16.
25. Case C–53/03, Syfait v GlaxoSmithKline, judgement
of May 31, 2005. With thanks to Lisa Arsenidou for her
assistance.
However, the ruling was still important because
the court found that the Greek Competition
Commission (the Epitropi Antagonismou) was not
a ‘‘court or tribunal’’ able to refer a case to the
European Court for a preliminary ruling.
GlaxoSmithKline (‘‘GSK’’) supplied medicinal
products including Imigran (for migraines), Lam-
ictal (for epilepsy) and Serevent (for asthma)
to pharmacists and pharmaceutical wholesalers
through its Greek subsidiary. Until November
2000, GSK met all orders in full, although a
large amount were then exported to other Mem-
ber States. After November 2000, GSK stated that
it would stop supplying wholesalers and supply
hospitals and pharmacies directly, because such
exports were resulting in shortages in Greece. In
practice, GSK continued to supply, but in limited
quantities.
The Greek associations of pharmacies and
pharmaceutical wholesalers then complained to
the Greek Commission. The Greek Commission
ordered interim measures, requiring GSK to
meet the associations’ orders in full. GSK’s
Greek subsidiary then met the complainants’
orders to the extent that it was supplied by its
parent company, meaning with more than Greek
consumption (as required by law, 125 per cent),
but not enough to meet the complainants orders
in full. GSK also made a notification to the Greek
Commission seeking negative clearance for its
system.
The Greek Commission then asked the ECJ
whether and in what circumstances a dominant
pharmaceutical company could refuse to meet
orders placed with it by wholesalers to restrict
parallel trade in its products. Interestingly,
Advocate General Jacobs suggested that, in defined
circumstances, such a refusal might not be an
abuse.26
Europe was therefore poised for a critical
ruling addressing the Art.82 EC dimension of the
debate on pharmaceutical parallel trade and State
intervention on national pricing levels.
It did not happen. Instead, the ECJ found
that the Greek Commission was not a court
or tribunal which could refer a question under
Art.234 EC, because it did not have the appropriate
independence and was not called upon to give
judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a
decision of a judicial nature.
According to settled case law, in order to
determine whether a body making a reference
is a court or tribunal for these purposes, the ECJ
takes account of factors such as whether the body
is established by law, whether it is permanent,
whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether
its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies
rules of law and whether it is independent. It
26. See last year’s review, fn.3 above, at p.60.
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may also be recalled that the ECJ has found that
the Spanish Competition Commission could make
such a reference in the past.27
In this case, the court found that these criteria
were not met:
— First, the Greek Commission was subject
to the supervision of the Minister of
Development to a certain extent. According
to the court, this implied that the minister
was empowered, within certain limits, to
review the lawfulness of the decisions
adopted by the Commission.
— Secondly, the dismissal or termination
of the appointment of members of the
Greek Commission was not subject to any
particular safeguards.
— Thirdly, there was no separation of func-
tions between the decision-making body
of the Greek Commission and its secre-
tariat, a fact-finding body on the basis
of whose proposal the Greek Commission
adopts decisions. The Commission’s Presi-
dent was responsible for the co-ordination
and general policy of the secretariat and was
the immediate supervisor of the secretariat’s
personnel, who could exercise disciplinary
power over them.
— Lastly and importantly, at [34], the ECJ
noted that it was not clear that proceed-
ings initiated before the Greek Commission
would lead to a decision of a judicial nature
because, as a national competition author-
ity, it was required to work in close co-
operation with the European Commission
and could be relieved of its competence by
a Commission decision initiating its own
proceedings (under Art.11(6) of Regulation
1/2003).
What should one conclude from all this? The
author would suggest:
First, the ECJ is being strict on what is required
for national competition authorities (‘‘NCA’’)
independence. This may be deliberate, given their
enhanced role in EC competition enforcement
now.
Secondly, the ECJ appears to prefer a hierarchi-
cal co-ordination whereby the NCAs co-operate
with the Commission and issues come to the ECJ
or CFI only on appeal from NCAs. In particular,
one may think that the Art.11(6) point in this
judgment may now mean that no NCA can refer a
question to the ECJ, or at least not unless the Com-
mission has made it clear that it will not intervene
to take a case.
27. Case C–67/91, Asociacio´n Espan˜ola de Banca
Privada, judgment of July 16, 1992 [1992] E.C.R. I-4785.
Thirdly, on the pharmaceutical issue, we will
have to see what comes next. The issue appears to
be one for ECN co-operation with the Commission
(since EC law is raised), unless the Commission
just leaves the Greek Commission to take a
decision (perhaps still influenced by Advocate
General Jacobs’ views) and then, presumably, the
difficult issues raised may come back to the ECJ
again on a reference from the appeal court!
Independent (car) agents
In September 2005, the CFI heavily reduced the
fine imposed on DaimlerChrysler for restricting
parallel imports and annulled the Commission’s
2001 decision as regards Germany and Spain, but
upheld the decision as regards Belgium.28 That
meant that DaimlerChrysler’s fine was reduced
from ¤71.8 million to ¤9.8 million.
It may be recalled that in 2001 the Commis-
sion found that DaimlerChrysler had concluded
agreements with its agents and dealers in Ger-
many, Belgium and Spain on retail sales of
its Mercedes-Benz cars.29 The Commission fined
DaimlerChrysler:
— Some ¤47 million for giving its German
agents instructions to sell new cars only to
customers in their own contract territory, to
avoid internal competition and to require
the payment of a 15 per cent deposit for
orders from abroad.
— ¤15 million for prohibiting German agents
and Spanish dealers from supplying cars to
leasing companies where no customer was
identified, which the Commission found
was designed to stop such companies from
obtaining volume rebates and accumulating
stock.
— ¤9.8 million for participating in resale
price maintenance agreements restricting
discounts in Belgium.
On appeal, the CFI found that the German
agents were to be assimilated to employees
of DaimlerChrysler and were therefore part
of DaimlerChrysler’s economic unit. The court
overturned the related fines accordingly. On that
basis, DaimlerChrysler was found to have acted
unilaterally in its behaviour with such agents.
The CFI found that the Commission had incor-
rectly assessed the fundamental characteristics of
the German agency contract concerned, which is
based on the German Commercial Code. Notably,
Mercedes-Benz set the prices and took the main
risks of the sale of the cars concerned, not the
28. Case T–325/01 DaimlerChrysler AG v Commission,
judgment of September 15, 2005. With thanks to Lisa
Arsenidou for her assistance.
29. [2002] O.J. L257/1.
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agents.30 It was Mercedes-Benz which sold the
cars and took the risks on delivery and of insol-
vency of the customer. The fact that the agent
could rebate his own commission did not change
this. Nor did the agent have to hold a stock of
new cars (in contrast to the position in Mercedes’
agreements with dealers in Belgium and Spain).
All this meant that the Commission was wrong
to find that German agents took the ‘‘risk of the
price’’ paid and were independent.
The CFI also found that, in practice, the Com-
mission had overstated the risk of transportation
of the cars (notably since many were picked up at
the factory) and the risks related to the obligation
of agents to purchase demonstration cars (since
these were normally supplied at preferential rates
and could be sold only a few months later). It was
also not established that obligations on agents to
provide guarantee services were a ‘‘risk’’, since
this was compensated and it had not been shown
that such remuneration was inadequate.
Finally, the fact that an agent had to provide
after sales services had not been shown by the
Commission to involve appreciable risks. In any
event, if it did, the court found that they related to
activities on other markets to that for the resale of
new cars31 and, according to the court, this should
not modify the characterisation of the relationship
between Mercedes-Benz and its agents on the (new
car supply) market concerned here.
This is an important ruling. The CFI focuses
strictly on the assessment of the agent’s indepen-
dence in terms of the risk of the transaction on the
market concerned and not on broader considera-
tions as to the risks of the agent’s business.
As regards Spain, the court found that
the restrictions of which DaimlerChrysler was
accused, namely that each leasing company had to
have an identified customer for a leasing contract
at the time of acquiring a vehicle, were derived
from Spanish legislation and were therefore also
not contrary to Art.81(1) EC.32
On the other hand, the court confirmed that
DaimlerChrysler had participated in agreements
with dealers in Belgium to prevent discounts and
upheld that part of the Commission’s decision.
Mercedes-Benz had been found to participate in
dealer meetings where measures were discussed to
prevent discounts, including ‘‘ghost shoppers’’ to
verify prices. There had also been a threat of non-
supply of a dealer’s allocation of cars if discounts
were too low. The court rejected Mercedes-Benz’s
arguments that such discussions only involved
‘‘recommendations’’.
30. fn.28 above, at [90]–[102].
31. ibid., at [104]–[113].
32. ibid., at [156].
Limitation
In October 2005, the CFI issued its judgment in
Sumitomo/Sumika, annulling the Commission’s
decision that these two companies had partici-
pated in the vitamins cartel.33
In November 2001, the Commission had issued
a decision in which it found that Sumitomo
and Sumika participated in the vitamins cartel
as regards vitamin H and folic acid, but it did
not impose any fines on the two companies.34
The Commission found that the infringements
committed by Sumitomo and Sumika had lasted
from October 1991 to April 1994 and from January
1991 to June 1994 respectively. Limitation barred
the Commission from imposing a fine on the two
companies.
The two companies claimed during the admin-
istrative procedure that the findings of infringe-
ment themselves were time-barred, so that Com-
mission had no power to find that the two com-
panies committed those infringements. It may be
recalled that Art.1 of Regulation 2988/74 provides,
among other things, that the power of the Com-
mission to impose fines or penalties for (ordinary)
infringements of the EC competition rules is sub-
ject to a limitation period of five years.
When the Commission rejected that position in
its decision, Sumitomo and Sumika appealed to
the CFI, with two main lines of argument.
First, they argued that the term ‘‘penalty’’ in
Art.1 of Regulation 2988/74 should be interpreted
to include a formal prohibition decision without
fines, because at least three types of punitive effect
flow from it:
(1) A finding of infringement in an allegedly
worldwide cartel is capable of giving rise to
other public law proceedings in Member
States with different rules on limitation
periods and in other countries where the
finding may be used as prima facie evidence
of the infringement there.
(2) Applicants could face damages actions
based on this decision.
(3) The decision is detrimental to their reputa-
tion.
They also claimed that the Commission was time-
barred from adopting a decision against them by
reason of general principles of Community law,
such as legal certainty and the presumption of
innocence.
Secondly, the companies alleged that the
Commission had no competence to adopt a
decision that they had infringed Art.81(1) EC,
where the infringement had come to an end
33. Joined Cases T–22 and 23/02, judgment of October
6, 2005. With thanks to Helena Dolezalova.
34. [2003] O.J. L6/1.
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Box 4
• Main European Court cases—cartel appeals
— Speciality Graphites
* Fine on SGL Carbon on isostatic graphite market halved. Mistake in turnover used for starting amount
* When should cartels be broken out and assessed/fined separately?
* Captive sales included for fining turnover
* Deterrence reduction maintained, despite fine reductions by CFI
— Pre-insulated Pipes
* Companies could have reasonably foreseen that the Commission would introduce the 1998 Fining
Guidelines method?
— SAS Maersk
* Changed position on facts during appeal? Compare to position during the administrative procedure
— Belgian Beer
* No principle of limitation in recidivism in statutory framework (but perhaps there should be?)
outside the limitation period of Art.1 of Regulation
2988/74. They argued that the Commission had
failed to show that it had a legitimate interest in
taking such a decision (in particular, the existence
of a genuine danger of a return to such a practice
by the two companies).
The CFI rejected the first line of argument but
upheld the second.
The court concluded that a decision finding an
infringement is not a ‘‘penalty’’ within the mean-
ing of Art.1(1) of Regulation 2988/74. The word
‘‘penalty’’ there was intended to capture pecu-
niary sanctions which could be imposed other
than fines (e.g. periodic payments).35 Therefore
such a finding was not subject to the limitation
period.
As regards the companies’ second line of
argument, the CFI held that the fact that the
Commission had no longer power to impose fines
for infringements because the limitation period
had expired did not imply that the Commission
had also lost the power to adopt a decision finding
a past infringement.
The exercise of this power was, however,
subject to the requirement that the Commission
show that it had a legitimate interest in taking
such a decision (as the ECJ had held in the
GVL36 case). While the Commission had suggested
several possible grounds for such an interest
to the Court (e.g. clarifying the legal situation,
promoting exemplary behaviour on the part of the
undertakings concerned, discouraging recidivism
and assisting national court proceedings by
injured parties), it had not specifically explained
what ground it relied on in this case as constituting
a legitimate interest in taking this decision.37
The CFI concluded that the Commission
had failed to consider whether the findings of
infringements against the applicants were justified
by a legitimate interest.38 Consequently, the CFI
annulled the Commission decision.
35. fn.33 above, at [60]–[61].
36. Case 7/82 [1983] E.C.R. 483.
37. fn.33 above, at [37], [121]–[122] and [138].
38. ibid., at [135]–[138].
Cartel appeals
Speciality Graphites
In June 2005, the CFI ruled on appeals in the
Speciality Graphites cartel case.39 In the case of
SGL Carbon, its fine in relation to the isostatic
graphite cartel was reduced from ¤18.94 million
to ¤9.64 million. In the case of Intech EDM AG,
its fine was reduced from ¤980,000 to ¤420,000.
The following are the particular noteworthy
aspects of the judgment:
First, there is interesting argument about the
way that the Commission separated out three
cartels in the graphite sector, one dealt with in
the Graphite Electrodes case and the other two in
the Speciality Graphites case, with the separate
calculations for the ‘‘isostatic’’ and ‘‘extruded’’
graphite products. Essentially SGL Carbon argued
that this artificially inflated the amount of fines
(because of the tariff system, etc.). The CFI
rejected the argument because it found that the
Commission had been entitled to distinguish three
separate infringements. They involved products
on different markets, generally different cartel
participants (although there were some overlaps)
and different elements in the nature of the
infringements.40
This is interesting because on other occasions
the Commission has dealt together with various
unlawful activities, talking of one ‘‘complex’’
and/or multiform’’ infringement and of unlawful
behaviour as all part of an ‘‘overall plan’’ to distort
competition in a (broadly stated) market (see, for
example the Copper Plumbing Tubes or Choline
Chloride decisions described below). The issue
may be important, because it may affect the overall
amount of fines imposed.
Secondly, it appears that in the Statement of
Objections, SGL Carbon was considered to be a
ringleader in the isostatic cartel, together with
Le Carbone, but was surprised to discover in
39. Joined Cases T–71/03, T–74/03, T–87/03 and
T–91/03, judgment of June 15, 2005.
40. ibid., at [117]–[129].
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the decision that Le Carbone had successfully
rebutted that claim. The CFI found that the
Commission’s change in position was, however,
not a new allegation on which SGL Carbon had
not had an opportunity to be heard. The court
considered that SGL Carbon should have been
able to foresee that Le Carbone might argue as it
did and itself contest that it was a ringleader.41
However, when considering whether a 50 per
cent increase in fine on SGL Carbon for being a
ringleader was justified, the court found that there
was not such a difference between its conduct and
that of others and reduced that increase to 33 per
cent.42
Thirdly, the court found that the Commission
had made a manifest error in assessing SGL Car-
bon’s worldwide turnover in isostatic graphite,43
which had an important impact on the related
fine, partly because it was early in the calculation.
Thus SGL Carbon had supplied the Commission
with figures for a wider product group (including
products other than isostatic graphite), but then
corrected them to focus on the isostatic products
concerned in the case. However, the Commis-
sion had continued to use the first figures given
in assessing SGL Carbon’s starting amount. In
practice, that meant that the Commission had
taken into account a turnover of ¤80.4 million
in 1997, when it should have taken ¤45.6 million.
This meant that SGL’s starting amount changed
from ¤20 million to ¤11.3 million (with related
‘‘knock-on’’ effects in the overall fine calculation).
(Interestingly, however, the CFI decided not to
adjust the starting amounts of the other compa-
nies, in so far as on the new figures, ToyoTanso
was the largest producer.44)
Fourthly, in considering SGL Carbon’s turnover,
the court confirmed that the Commission could
include its internal sales. The court’s position is
that otherwise this would give an unfair advantage
to vertically integrated companies.45 (This is not
new, but is noted here because the issue is often
raised in practice.)
Fifthly, the CFI found that the ‘‘10% of
turnover’’ limit should have been applied sepa-
rately to the two Intech companies in the case,
since each had been found to have participated in
the infringement and Intech/EDM BV had ceased
to be the parent of Intech EDM AG in 1997
(even if both still belonged to the same holding
company).46 The result was that the fine on Intech
EDM AG was reduced from ¤980,000 to ¤420,000.
Sixthly, the Commission argued that if the
court significantly reduced the starting amount
41. ibid., at [151].
42. ibid., at [327]–[331].
43. ibid., at [251].
44. ibid., at [265].
45. ibid., at [260].
46. ibid., at [390]–[392].
of the fine (as it did), then the 33 per cent
reduction which the Commission had given SGL
Carbon (because of the two fines it faced in
quick succession and its straightened financial
circumstances) was unjustified. The CFI rejected
this, considering that the factors justifying that 33
per cent reduction remained valid, even after the
adjustments made to the starting amount.47
Finally, the court (again) confirms that there
is no double punishment (non bis in idem plea),
if a company is fined in the United States and
in the EU, the respective authorities fining for
the infringements in their respective territories.
Nor is there double punishment because the
Commission considered the worldwide turnover
of the companies concerned in attributing relative
weightings to companies for fining purposes.
(Again this is not new, but noted here because
it still comes up frequently in practice.)
Pre-insulated Pipes
In June 2005, the ECJ upheld the CFI’s judgments
concerning the Pre-insulated Pipes cartel.48 The
main point in the judgment is that the ECJ found
that the application of the 1998 Fining Guidelines
to infringements committed before the Guidelines
were adopted was not contrary to the principles
of protection of legitimate expectations49 and
non-retroactivity.50 The court found that the
Guidelines and the new method of calculating
fines therein were ‘‘reasonably foreseeable’’ at the
time the infringements were committed.51
This is clearly still controversial. Companies
might well have been advised that the Commission
had a very wide discretion to determine the
gravity of an infringement and could increase
fining levels, provided that the Commission stayed
with the ‘‘10% of turnover’’ limit in Art.15(2) of
Regulation 17/62. This appears essentially to be
the court’s position. However, it is very hard to
see how companies or their advisers could have
‘‘reasonably foreseen’’ that the Commission would
introduce an entirely new fine calculation method,
based on a tariff system, which is what the ECJ
also appears to state in the judgment.
In practice, it was also somewhat hard on
the companies concerned, since the new Fining
Guidelines were introduced after the Statement of
Objections and Hearings in the case. It was also
not disputed that the Guidelines were applied in
the Commission’s decision, although not referred
to.52 One might think that it would have been more
reasonable to apply the Guidelines only for future
47. ibid., at [404]–[407].
48. Joined Cases C–189/02P, C–202/02P, C–205/02P to
C–208/02P and C–213/02P, judgment of June 28, 2005.
49. ibid., at [169]–[173].
50. ibid., at [207]–[232].
51. e.g. ibid., at [231], [440] and [454].
52. ibid., at [26]–[27].
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procedures (or at least those not yet at the level of
Statement of Objections). However, the problem
for the Commission then is delay and the many
cases it has in the pipeline.
One senses that the ECJ considered that it had
to find this way, or the court would have been
introducing general limits on the Commission’s
ability to change its policy to deter cartels. Neither
the ECJ nor CFI appear willing to do so, save
to the extent of specific review on the basis of
proportionality and equal treatment and checking
that the Fining Guidelines have been applied
properly.
Alloy Surcharge
In July 2005, the ECJ ruled on appeals from the
CFI’s judgment in the Alloy Surcharge cartel
case.53 It may be recalled that in 1998 the
Commission fined six producers of stainless steel
for jointly agreeing the price supplement called
the ‘‘Alloy Surcharge’’, which they added to the
basic price for stainless steel for use of certain
alloys (nickel, chromium and molybdenun).
On appeal, the CFI largely confirmed the
Commission’s decision, but reduced the fine
on three companies because it found that the
Commission had infringed the principle of equal
treatment by taking the view that they had
not produced any new information within the
meaning of the Commission’s Leniency Notice.
The three companies then appealed further.
As regards Acerinox’s appeal, the ECJ considered
that the CFI had incorrectly presented Acerinox’s
position concerning that company’s participation
in a cartel in Spain and therefore that the CFI’s
reasoning in this respect was incorrect.54 However,
the ECJ still considered that the Commission
had correctly concluded that Acerinox had
participated in such a cartel and therefore upheld
the fine on Acerinox. Otherwise the ECJ dismissed
the claims made.
Luxembourg Breweries
In July 2005, the CFI upheld the Commission’s
decision concerning the Luxembourg Breweries
cartel.55 It may be recalled that in 2001 the
Commission found that Luxembourg brewers had
entered into an agreement to preserve their
respective customers/beer ties in the hotels,
restaurants and cafe´s sector and to prevent foreign
breweries from penetrating the sector, imposing
relatively small fines of some ¤400,000 to ¤24,000
on the participants.
53. Case C–57/02PAcerinox and Joined Cases C–65/02P
and C–73/02P,Thyssen Krupp and Thyssen KruppAcciai
Speciali Terni, judgments of July 14, 2005.
54. ibid., at [34].
55. Joined Cases T–49/02 to T–51/02, Brasserie
nationale, Brasserie Jules Simon and Brasserie Battin,
judgment of July 27, 2005.
The companies appealed, arguing among other
things that the infringement was ‘‘minor’’, not
serious. The CFI rejected all claims made. It noted
that an agreement which covered the territory of a
whole Member State, with the object of dividing
the market and partitioning the common market,
could not be considered a ‘‘minor’’ infringement
under the Commission’s Fining Guidelines. The
CFI also found that it was no defence to argue,
as the brewers did, that the co-operation had
been designed to deal with the problem that the
Luxembourg courts were systematically annulling
exclusive beer ties. In any event, the co-operation
had been wider than that, applying also where
there was no exclusive tie.
SAS Maersk
In July 2005, the CFI also upheld the Commission’s
decision in the SAS-Maersk airline case.56 It will
be recalled that this case related to a market-
sharing agreement between SAS and Maersk
which resulted in fines on SAS of some ¤39.37
million and on Maersk, ¤13.12 million. In
its decision, the Commission had found the
infringement ‘‘very serious’’, but had reduced
the fine by 10 per cent, since neither SAS nor
Maersk had contested the facts in the Statement
of Objections.
On appeal, SAS challenged the Commission’s
view that the infringement was ‘‘very serious’’,
suggesting that it should have been considered
‘‘serious’’, among other things because the case
was limited in effect and comparable to the Greek
Ferries case. The Commission had also described
the affected geographic market as ‘‘the EEA and
beyond’’, whereas SAS argued that, in fact, the
markets in issue were only a limited number
of point to point combinations to Denmark.
Further, the Commission had taken into account
statements as to the perceived gains from the
market sharing, which SAS contested.
The CFI upheld the Commission’s view, noting
that infringements which do not cover the whole
of the common market may still be ‘‘very serious’’.
The court also considered that the Commission
is not obliged to define the markets in question
for the purposes of applying its Guidelines (a
principle which is still controversial given the
need to assess proportionality). The Commission
had been entitled under its Guidelines to take into
account any economic benefit which may have
been derived by offenders.
Otherwise, it is of interest to note that the
Commission applied to the CFI for an increase in
the fine imposed, because of alleged challenges by
SAS as to the scope and nature of the infringement
56. Case T–241/01, SAS v Commission, judgment of July
18, 2005. With thanks to Georg Terhorst for his assistance.
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in its Reply before the Court. The Commission
argued that SAS was substantially contesting the
facts. The court rejected the Commission’s claim.
It noted that the key issue in such a case is whether
an applicant before the court had gone back
on facts acknowledged during the administrative
procedure.57 However, here SAS had already said
in its Reply to the Statement of Objections that
the infringements did not have an effect on the
market, which it was maintaining on appeal in
claiming a reduction in fine. Therefore SAS was
not changing its position from that for which it
had been given the 10 per cent reduction and no
increase in fine was to be considered.
Belgian Beer
In October 2005, the CFI ruled on Danone’s appeal
against the Belgian Beer ‘‘non-aggression pact’’
cartel case.58 Put shortly, in December 2001, the
Commission imposed fines on Belgian brewers
for three cartels. In the Belgian case total fines
of ¤91 million were imposed on Danone (and
its subsidiary Alken-Maes) and Interbrew for two
separate infringements on the Belgian beer market
between 1993 and 1998. Danone was fined a total
of ¤44.6 million for participating in a general
‘‘non-aggression pact’’ with Interbrew from early
1993 until the beginning of 1998 in the horeca
(hotels, restaurants and cafe´) sector.
Among other things, the Commission found
that Danone had threatened Interbrew that if
Interbrew did not transfer 500,000 hectolitres of
beer in the Belgian retail sector to Alken-Maes,
Danone would ‘‘make life difficult’’ for Interbrew
in France. Allegedly, this threat had led to a
‘‘gentleman’s agreement’’ in 1994, by which the
parties committed themselves generally to respect
each other’s market positions (and more specific
agreements and practices).
Danone’s fine was increased by 50 per cent
for two aggravating factors: first, recidivism. The
Commission noted that Danone had infringed
competition law twice before in the flat glass
sector (as BSN). Secondly, Danone’s threat of
retaliation, which allegedly led to an increase of
cartel activity, was treated as an ‘‘aggravating’’
circumstance.
On appeal, the CFI rejected all of Danone’s
claims, save that the court found Danone’s threat
had not induced Interbrew to enter into the ‘‘non-
aggression pact’’. Taking into account the parties’
attitudes before and after the threat, as well as
the importance of the threat in its context, the
court stated that the agreement could have been
the result of the parties’ common objectives to
57. ibid., at [238].
58. Case T–38/02, Groupe Danone v Commission,
judgment of October 25, 2005. With thanks to Lisa
Arsenidou for her assistance.
restrict competition in general.59 Danone’s fine
was therefore reduced by ¤1.6 million from ¤44
million to ¤42.4 million.
The court then asked the Commission what
percentage of the 50 per cent increase it had
imposed on the basic amount for aggravating
circumstances related to the threat. On being
told that this was a ‘‘lesser’’ amount, the court
attributed 10 per cent of the 50 per cent to
it and reduced the increase for aggravating
circumstances to 40 per cent from 50 per cent.
Otherwise, the CFI found that the Commission
had deviated from its Guidelines when calculating
the fine, since in its calculations it had not applied
the aggravating circumstance increase to the basic
amount of the fine, but had applied it to a fine
which had already been ‘‘adjusted’’.60 The CFI
therefore corrected this also.
Three other points may be noted: first, (some-
what bravely) Danone challenged the level of
starting amount which the Commission had set
as disproportionate. Although accepting that the
court should verify the proportionality of a fine,
given its gravity and duration, the court rejected
this on the facts, since it found that the Com-
mission had reasonable grounds for its finding in
discretion and on its Fining Guidelines.61
Secondly, Danone argued that there should be
some principle of limitation as regards recidivism
claims, based on legal certainty, an argument
which is frequently raised in practice. The CFI
rejected this on the basis that no such principle is
provided for in the relevant statutory framework.
In any event the court found that, on the facts,
the time between the third infringement (in 1993)
and the second one (in 1984) was not excessive
(although the time between the 1993 infringement
and the first one (in 1974) was long.62)
Thirdly, Danone argued that recidivism should
not be found, if there was no pecuniary sanction
for the first infringement (as was the case for
the 1974 infringement), an argument open on
the Thyssen Stahl case. The court took the view
that this was not the case. The fact that the first
infringement was analogous was enough, even if
it had not involved a pecuniary sanction.63 In
any event, a fine had been imposed for the 1984
infringement.
Football agents’ complaint
In January 2005, the CFI upheld the decision
of the Commission to reject a complaint by
Mr Laurent Piau against its settlement of the
59. ibid., at [295]–[313].
60. ibid., at [521]–[523].
61. ibid., at [145] et seq.
62. ibid., at [353–[355].
63. ibid., at [362]–[366].
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FIFA players’ agents case.64 It may be recalled
that in 1999 the Commission challenged various
provisions of regulations established by FIFA in
1994 concerning players’ agents. FIFA then agreed
to amend its regulations in 2000/2001. However,
the regulations still provided that a player’s agent
had to:
— hold a licence from a national association
for an unlimited period;
— pass an examination in the form of a
multiple-choice test;
— have a written contract, with the player rep-
resented for a maximum of two years, but
renewable, in which the agent’s remunera-
tion is calculated on the basis of the player’s
basic gross salary (or, if the parties cannot
reach agreement, fixed at 5 per cent of the
salary);
— hold a professional liability insurance
policy (or provide a bank guarantee);
— hold a system of sanctions on clubs, players
and agents in relation thereto.
The Commission indicated to Mr Piau in 2001
that it would take no further action on his
complaint, on the basis that the main restrictions
in the 1994 regulations had been removed and
that it was not in the Community interest for
the Commission to continue with the procedure.
However, Mr Piau maintained his complaint,
arguing that these amended regulations were still
unlawful, as contrary to Arts 81 and 82 EC. When
the Commission still rejected his complaint, he
appealed.
The CFI’s review falls into three parts. First,
the court considered how the Commission had
treated Mr Piau’s complaint and found that it had
not failed in its obligations to consider the case
carefully, in view of the way it had carried out its
intervention.
Secondly, the court then reviewed the Com-
munity interest in the case. The court found that
FIFA was an association of national football asso-
ciations, themselves representing football clubs,
whose activities came within Art.81 EC. Equally,
it found that a player’s agent carried out an eco-
nomic activity which was not specific to the nature
of sport and therefore came within Art.81 EC.65
The court then also focused on the Commis-
sion’s decision concerning the compatibility of
the FIFA regulations with competition law. On
this, the CFI held that the Commission had not
made a manifest error in finding that the most seri-
ous restrictions of competition had been repealed.
Notably,66 the examination required to become an
64. Case T–193/02, judgment of January 26, 2005. The
case is under appeal.
65. ibid., at [72]–[73].
66. ibid., at [96].
agent offered satisfactory guarantees of objectivity
and transparency; the obligation to take profes-
sional insurance was not disproportionate; and the
court considered that the remuneration provisions
did not amount to imposing prices (since the 5 per
cent provision was only a fall-back mechanism for
settlement of disputes).
The court also noted that the obligation to hold
a licence to be a player’s agent was a barrier
to access to the agent’s activity and affected
competition, which could only be accepted if it
met the conditions under Art.81(3) EC (although
elsewhere in the judgment, the court appeared to
find licence requirements qualitative in nature).67
However, the court agreed with the Commission
that the conditions for application of Art.81(3)
EC could apply. Notably, the FIFA rules could
be justified: as necessary to raise professional and
ethical standards among players’ agents; to protect
players whose careers are short; by the absence
of national rules on such issues (save in France);
and the lack of a collective organisation of player’s
agents. Moreover, the court noted that competition
is not eliminated by the system, which involved
a qualitative, rather than quantitative selection.
(FIFA had noted here that, while there were
some 214 players’ agents in 1996, there were
some 1500 at the beginning of 2003, with more
coming.)
Thirdly, the court considered whether Art.82
EC could apply, which the Commission had
rejected, since FIFA was not active on the market
of advising players, like players’ agents. Here, the
court found, somewhat surprisingly, that FIFA,
as an emanation of the football clubs, might be
considered to hold a collective dominant position
on the market of services of players’ agents, in so
far as the clubs were linked together in setting the
Players’ Agents Regulations and the clubs were
buyers of the Players’ Agents’ Services.68 In any
event, the court considered that the rules were
not an abuse for the same reasons that they were
capable of exemption under Art.81(3) EC, in other
words because of their qualitative nature. As a
result, the Commission had been right to find that
there was no infringement of Art.82 EC.
Italian Bar rules
In February 2005 in Mauri, the ECJ found that
certain Italian rules on access to the Milan Bar
were not contrary to the EC Competition rules.69
It appears that Mr Mauri took the written
exams to be admitted to the Milan Bar but did
not obtain enough points to be admitted to the
subsequent oral stage of the exams. He then
67. ibid., at [101], [103] and [117].
68. ibid., at [113]–[116].
69. Case C–250/03 [2005] E.C.R. I-1267, Order of
February 17, 2005.
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appealed, arguing that the structure of the State
Examination Committee was unlawful because it
included two members of the Milan Bar, who
were, moreover, the President and vice-president
of the committee in question. He argued therefore
that the way the committee was constituted was
contrary to the EC competition rules and rules on
freedom of establishment. The other members of
the committee were two judges and a professor
of law. It appears that there is such a committee
for each Court of Appeal district in Italy and the
members thereof are nominated by the Minister of
Justice.
The Regional Administrative Court of Lom-
bardy referred the question as to whether such
rules were unlawful as claimed, notably in so far
as the committee could protect the interests of
existing lawyers, limiting access to the profession
quantitatively.
The ECJ ruled that the Italian regulations
were not unlawful, noting in particular that
the Italian state had a substantial presence in
the committee through the two judges and the
Minister of Justice controlled the work of the
committee at each stage. Further, a negative
decision by the committee could be appealed
to the administrative courts. As such the ECJ
found, following Arduino, that the Italian state
had not delegated its powers to private operators,
nor favoured the conclusion of anti-competitive
agreements. Even if the participation of lawyers
in the committee might restrict the freedom of
establishment, it was also justified to ensure the
best evaluation of the candidates.
Commission decisions
Cartels
Choline Chloride decision
In December 2004, the Commission announced
that it had imposed fines of some ¤66.34 million
on Akzo Nobel, BASF and UCB for participating
Box 5
New cartel fines (November 2004–October 2005)
Total Highest company
Fines fines(s)
Choline Chloride: ¤66.34 BASF ¤34.97
Monochloroacetic: ¤216.91 Akzo Nobel ¤84.38
Industrial Thread: ¤43.00 Coats ¤15.05
Italian Raw Tobacco: ¤56.00 Deltafina ¤30
¤382.25
(All figures are ¤ million)
in a cartel on the European market for Choline
Chloride, known as Vitamin B4.70 The other
companies concerned were Bioproducts, DuCoa
(from the United States) and Chinook (from
Canada). This product is mainly used as a feed
additive for poultry and pigs. It is sold to animal
feed producers, which in turn supply farmers.
It appears that there were two phases in the
events.
From October 1992 to April 1994, the main
North American and European producers of
choline chloride met in a global cartel. The
North American producers agreed not to enter
the European market, the Europeans agreed to
withdraw from the US market and the companies
concerned also agreed to correlate their positions
in the Far East and Latin America (with meetings
in Mexico and Malaysia and a key agreement
called the ‘‘Ludwigshafen agreement’’ in 1992).71
Then, between March 1994 and October 1998,
the European producers agreed prices, allocated
customers and agreed market shares in Europe.
The Commission treats this as one infringement
involving an overall scheme, with two related
‘‘levels’’, a global one and a European one. More
70. IP/04/1454, December 9, 2004. The summary of
the decision was published in [2005] O.J. L190/22.
The non-confidential version of the decision is on the
Commission’s website.
71. See, in particular, ibid., at [77] of the non-
confidential decision.
Box 6
• Cartel decision issues
— Significant reductions for evidentiary contributions outside the 1996 Leniency Notice
— Cartels infringements as
* overall plans and complex, ‘‘multi-form’’ infringements or
* several distinct infringements (geographically or in time)
— To be first in, you have to give decisive evidence first
* The EU system is not a ‘‘marker’’ system as in the United States
— Interplay issues with US prosecutions (Sorbates)
— Commission focus on ‘‘supports’’ to cartels
* Swiss statistics firm and trade associations (several cases)
— Immunity withheld for revealing immunity application (Italian Raw Tobacco)
— Government influence strong mitigation in Spanish Raw Tobacco case—40 per cent reduction
— Distinctions between types of cartel when assessing recidivism
* Armistice and equilibrium agreements not on a par with price-fixing (French Beer)
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specifically, the infringement was found to have
involved:
— Price-fixing 1992–1994 worldwide and then
in Europe 1994–1998.
— Action to control distributors and so-called
‘‘converters’’ (which would take choline
chloride in liquid form and convert it into a
dry ‘‘carrier’’ form, either for the account of
the producer or for their own account).
— Market allocation (at the global level,
generally on different continents; in Europe
as regards individual customers).
— Related exchange of commercially sensitive
information.
The North American companies ended their par-
ticipation in April 1994 and, applying limitation.
The Commission did not impose fines on them.
The Commission found that the infringement
was ‘‘very serious’’. The EEA market in the
last year of the infringement was valued at
¤52.6 million, the worldwide market at some
¤183.7 million. The Commission used the market
shares of the participants on a global level to
determine weightings for fining. Akzo Nobel’s
fine was increased by 50 per cent and BASF’s
fine by 100 per cent for deterrence, based on
the participants’ worldwide turnover in the last
financial year before the decision. BASF’s fine was
also increased by what the Commission calls ‘‘the
normal rate’’ of 50 per cent, for recidivism based
on its two previous infringements.72 The ultimate
individual fines were: Akzo Nobel ¤20.99 million,
BASF ¤34.97 million, UCB ¤10.38 million.
The following are the main points of particular
interest in the decision:
First, Chinook was in fact the first to approach
the Commission, but it was not allowed to claim
immunity because it did not then offer decisive
evidence, which Bioproducts did when it came
in a little later. The Commission stated that
Chinook’s counsel had said that the contacts
were ‘‘professional, exploratory and informal’’ in
nature.73
Secondly, the way that the Commission treats
the infringement as part of one overall scheme,
despite its two separate phases and levels. One
may note that otherwise fines for the global cartel
would have been time-barred for all since it would
have ended in April 1994 and the Commission’s
investigations only started in May 1999 (i.e.
more than five years later).74 In particular, the
Commission considered that the European phase
continued earlier action on prices and the control
of converters.
72. ibid., at [208].
73. ibid., at [45] and [52].
74. ibid., at [149]–[154], [184].
Thirdly, there was a parallel case in the United
States, which at times affected the EU procedure.
For example, when the Commission requested
certain information, DuCoA’s answer was ‘‘very
brief’’, apparently because three of its staff had
agreed to plead guilty in the US proceedings at
the time and the only copies of relevant records
had been seized by the US authorities.75
Fourthly, the Commission reduced UCB’s fine
by 25.8 per cent of the starting amount for
its evidentiary contribution outside the 1996
Leniency Notice.76 The Commission states that
before UCB’s information, it only knew of the
global co-operation and therefore the duration
would have been one and a half years, whereas
with that information, the Commission found that
the infringement extended until 1998, nearly six
years. The reduction takes away the increase in
the fine for UCB, based on that extended duration.
Fifthly, BASF argued that there was no need
to increase its fine for deterrence because it had
already acted to prevent future infringements as
a result of the parallel Vitamins proceedings.
However, the Commission’s position is that ‘‘each
separate infringement merits a separate fine,
which should be proportionate to the size of
the undertaking to be effective’’77 (and therefore
increased for deterrence).
Sixthly the hard enforcement line of recent
years continues as regards certain pleas. Thus the
Commission gave no reduction for termination
before the Commission intervened, disciplinary
measures on employees concerned, the introduc-
tion of a compliance programme and arguments
that the industry was in crisis.
Monochloroacetic Chemicals
In January 2005, the Commission announced that
it had fined Akzo Nobel, Atofina and Hoechst
some ¤216.91 million for a cartel in relation
to monochloroacetic acid (‘‘MCAA’’).78 This is a
chemical intermediate used to produce detergents,
adhesives, textile auxiliaries and thickeners and
is used in foods, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.
The Commission noted that the value of the
EEA market in MCAA was some ¤125 million.
The individual fines were: Akzo Nobel ¤84.38
million, Atofina ¤58.5 million, and Hoechst
¤74.03 million. A fourth company, Clariant, was
also in the cartel, having taken over Hoechst’s
75. ibid., at [50]. In the United States DuCoA and
Chinock pleaded guilty and paid fines totalling US$5.5
million. Five executives also pleaded guilty to a
conspiracy to fix prices and allocate customers. In
Canada, fines of some CAD $5 million were also imposed
and one executive was given a nine-month prison term.
76. ibid., at [218].
77. ibid., at [204].
78. IP/05/61, January 19, 2005. See Mayock (Spring
2005) EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter
71–72.
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MCAA business in 1997, but received a 100 per
cent reduction in fine for disclosing the cartel to
the Commission first.
Industrial Thread
In September 2005, the Commission fined pro-
ducers of industrial thread some ¤43.49 million
for two cartels and also noted the existence of an
earlier cartel.79
In November 2001 the Commission dawn
raided several EU producers of textile/haberdashery
products. As a result, the Commission found three
cartels:
— A cartel for industrial customers in the
Benelux and Nordic countries (from January
1990 until September 2001).
— A cartel for automotive customers in the
EEA from May/June 1998 until May 2000.
— A cartel for industrial customers in the
United Kingdom from October 1990 until
September 1996.
The cartels involved meetings and bilateral
contacts to agree on price increases and/or
target prices, to exchange information on price
lists/prices charged to individual customers and
to avoid undercutting an incumbent supplier’s
prices to allocated customers.
Industrial thread is used in various industries
to sew or embroider products such as clothes,
home furnishings, automotive seats and seatbelts,
leather goods, mattresses, footwear and ropes. The
Commission considered the infringements ‘‘very
serious’’, but appears to have tempered the fines
considerably (we are not yet told on what basis).
Thus fines for the Benelux/Nordic countries
infringements ranged from ¤15.05 million on
Coats and ¤13.09 million on Amann and So¨hne
to ¤0.5 million on Bieze Stork. Fines for the
automotive thread cartel ranged from ¤4.8 million
on Cousin/Amann to ¤0.65 million on Coats. No
fines were imposed for the UK case, because of
limitation.
Italian Raw Tobacco
In October 2005, the Commission announced that
it had fined four Italian tobacco processors a total
of ¤56 million for collusion on the prices paid
to growers and other intermediaries and on the
allocation of suppliers.80 The Commission has
also imposed small fines on the trade associations
of tobacco processors and tobacco growers for
engaging in collective price negotiations.
The case appears to be very similar to that con-
cerning Spanish raw tobacco (described below).
79. IP/05/1140, September 14, 2005.
80. IP/05/1315, October 20, 2005.
The Commission found that, between 1995 and
2002, the leading tobacco processors colluded
on their purchasing strategy, agreeing purchase
prices between themselves and allocating their
suppliers (growers and ‘‘third packers’’ which do
initial conditioning of tobacco) on a preferential
or exclusive basis. The Commission also found
that the tobacco processors had rigged their bids
in respect of public auctions organised by public
authorities for the sale of tobacco in 1995 and
1998.
From 1999 public negotiations took place
between the processors’ and growers’ trade
associations on reference minimum prices to
be inserted in ‘‘cultivation contracts’’ at the
beginning of the season. The processors also
colluded on the final prices that they would
pay upon delivery of tobacco, as well as on the
allocation of supplies.
The Commission emphasises that the behaviour
concerned was not required by the EU common
market organisation on raw tobacco. However,
the Commission also states that an Italian
law provided for the collective negotiation of
minimum prices in the agricultural sector, which
‘‘had a clear effect on the conduct of’’ the two
associations. The implication appears to be that
this was treated as strong mitigation, as in the
Spanish case.
Deltafina was fined ¤30 million. It appears that
Deltafina was initially granted conditional immu-
nity, but the Commission withheld that immunity,
because Deltafina was found to have breached
its co-operation obligations by revealing to its
competitors that it had applied for immunity.
However, the Commission still reduced Delta-
fina’s fine given its contribution to establishment
of the processors’ infringement. Other processors
were fined between ¤14 million and ¤2 million.
The two associations were fined ¤1000 each.
Spanish Raw Tobacco decision
The Commission has now published its 2004
decision in the Spanish RawTobacco cartel case.81
This case relates to two infringements:
— First, agreements and/or concerted practices
between the processors of raw tobacco in
Spain and the sister company of one of
them in Italy, which was a purchaser of
the tobacco concerned, in order to fix each
year the maximum average delivery prices
paid for each variety of raw tobacco; and to
share out the quantities of each variety of
tobacco bought between 1996 and 2001. For
three years, 1999–2001, the processors also
81. The decision is on the Commission’s website; see
also Reyners Fontana, De Luca and Morillas (Spring 2005)
EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter 65–66.
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agreed the price brackets per quality grade
of raw tobacco variety and other conditions
applicable.82
— Secondly, agreements and/or concerted
practices between the representatives of the
producers to fix each year the price-brackets
per quality grade for each variety of raw
tobacco and the additional conditions that
would apply, notably the minimum price to
be paid by the processors.
It appears that the origin of the cartel was
increases in the average buying prices offered to
producers in 1996, which made Spanish tobacco
less competitive on export markets, notably in
Italy.
The processors concerned were the Compan˜ie
Espanola de tobacco en rame SA (‘‘Cetarsa’’)
(which, until 1990, had a legal monopoly on
tobacco processing in Spain), Agroexpansion (a
subsidiary of US corporation Dimon), World
Wide Tobacco Espan˜a (‘‘WWTE’’; a subsidiary
of another US company, Standard Commercial
Corporation) and Tobacco Espan˜oles, a subsidiary
of another US company, Universal Corporation.
An Italian company, Deltafina, was also involved.
Deltafina was a sister company of Tobacco
Espan˜oles and a purchaser of tobacco in Spain.
The producers were essentially members of 10
groups and were linked through three agricultural
branch or union organisations and the Spanish
Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives.
Although most of the infringement appears to
have been localised to Spain, ‘‘effect on trade’’
was found because of the fact that the raw tobacco,
once processed, was sold mainly for export. The
Commission also argued that the infringements
extended over the whole territory of a Member
State, although conceding that the production area
concerned was in fact in one region of Spain.
The Commission noted that the market con-
cerned was ‘‘rather small’’, but considered both
infringements to be ‘‘very serious’’ because of
their nature. The value of tobacco bought in Spain
in 2001 was some ¤25 million. Deltafina was
fined ¤11.8 million, the processors between ¤3.6
million and ¤108.000 and the producers’ trade
association representatives ¤1000 each.
Particular aspects of the case were as follows:
First, the way that the sector was organised.
Notably, that there is a common market organisa-
tion for tobacco, that there were standard buying
and selling contracts for the purchasing and that,
even if joint negotiations between the proces-
sors and the producers were not required by law
(notably as regard prices), such negotiations were
at least actively encouraged by the Spanish Agri-
cultural Ministry.83
82. Decision, fn.81 above, at [274]–[277].
83. ibid., at [60]–[65], [291].
The Commission rejected any defence based
on the agricultural regulation of the sector,
quoting the ECJ’s judgment in Milk Marque that
‘‘the common organisations of the markets in
agricultural products are not ‘a competition free
zone’’’.84 In particular, the Commission noted
that EC regulations exempting co-operation in the
tobacco sector explicitly excluded agreements on
fixing prices or sharing out quantities.85
On the other hand, the Commission noted that
— ‘‘Standard’’ contracts had been given to
the Spanish Agricultural Ministry from
1995 to 1998, with the price clause still
blank, but mentioning that the producers’
representatives would negotiate jointly with
each individual processor on prices and
additional conditions.
— In 1999, the Spanish Agriculture Ministry
approved schedules of jointly negotiated
prices.
— In 2000 and 2001, the Spanish Agriculture
Ministry organised meetings, some of which
were held at the ministry itself, with a
view to agreeing on the price schedules.
(reminiscent of the actions of the French
minister in the French Beef crises case86).
As a result, the Commission accepted that the min-
istry had at least encouraged the joint negotiations.
Applying the Italian Matches case,87 the Commis-
sion found Art.81 EC applicable, but treated this
government influence as strong mitigation. Other-
wise, the Commission considered that the fines on
the producer representatives should be only sym-
bolic, again because of the role of the Agricultural
Ministry on their activities.
The Commission found that the public nego-
tiations between producers and processors deter-
mined at least to some extent the material frame-
work of the processor’s behaviour. The result was
a reduction of 40 per cent in the fines of the
processors and Deltafina.88
Secondly, Deltafina, the main purchaser of
Spanish tobacco from various processors, was
given the highest starting amount/position. The
Commission found that this gave Deltafina con-
siderable capacity to influence the Spanish pro-
cessors. Deltafina’s fine was also increased by 50
per cent, because it was considered to have had
a ‘‘key role’’ in the organisation of the restric-
tive practices, including acting as a mediator for
disputes between the processors.
84. ibid., at [345]; Case C–137/00, [2003] E.C.R. I–7975
at [57] and [61].
85. fn.81 above, at [348].
86. See [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 57–58.
87. Case C–198/01; [2003] E.C.R. I–8055.
88. fn.81 above, at [438].
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Thirdly, the position on leniency is not
straightforward. Tobacco Espan˜oles was given a
40 per cent reduction, in part because of its role in
explaining the involvement of Deltafina. However,
Deltafina did not have some the same treatment.
It appears that Deltafina had co-operated with
Tobacco Espan˜oles in providing information for
the latter’s leniency application, but otherwise
did not independently seek leniency (although
the parent of both companies asked that Deltafina
be considered for leniency also). However, this
was not considered to be enough of an application
by the Commission, which only granted Deltafina
10 per cent leniency.89
Carbon and Graphite decision
The Commission has now published its 2003
decision in this case which relates to electrical
and mechanical carbon and graphite products.90 It
may be recalled that the Commission had imposed
fines of some ¤101 million on five companies,
Le Carbone Lorraine (‘‘Le Carbone’’), Schunk,
SGL Carbon, Hoffman Elektrokohle and Conradty
Nu¨rnberg. The individual fines were: Carbone
Lorraine ¤43 million, SGL Carbon ¤23.6 million,
Schunk ¤30.8 million, Hoffmann ¤2.8 million and
Conradtly ¤1 million. Morgan Crucible obtained
full immunity.91
The infringement had three main aspects:
— First, the fixing of selling prices (including
agreements on specific bids to large (often
public) customers92 and other trading con-
ditions.
— Secondly, market-sharing, including agree-
ments on account leadership for major cus-
tomers and agreements not to advertise or
participate in sales exhibitions.
— Thirdly, concerted action against competi-
tors. This included co-ordinated quantity
restrictions, price increases or boycotts to
resellers that offered potential competi-
tion and coordinated price undercutting of
competitors.93
The Commission states that concentration in this
industry appears to have been going on since as
long ago as April 1937! However, in most cases
89. ibid., at [455]–[456].
90. The non-confidential version is on the Commission’s
website.
91. One may note that there were parallel US pro-
ceedings concerning a global cartel for certain types
of electrical carbon products. In 2002 Morgonite Inc
pleaded guilty to related charges. Its UK parent pleaded
guilty to charges of attempts to obstruct the investigation.
Agreed fines were some US$11 million, with four execu-
tives indicated. There had also been earlier proceedings
concerning graphite electrodes and speciality graphite.
92. Decision, fn.90 above, at [134].
93. ibid., at [91], [219], [239]–[241] and [278].
the Commission found infringements from 1988
to 1999 (some 11 years and 2 months) for which it
considered that it had adequate evidence.
The products concerned are carbon and
graphite products used for electrical and mechan-
ical applications and the blocks of carbon and
graphite from which these products are made.
It appears that there are many types of prod-
uct, tailored to specific applications, with carbon
products mainly used to transfer electricity and
products involving graphite used to seal gas and
liquids in vessels and to keep machines lubri-
cated. The market was found to be essentially
EEA-wide with a value of some ¤291 million in
1998.
There are three particularly interesting features
in the Commission’s decision:
First, there is a lot of detail about the
customers concerned in the decision. It appears
these were mainly (1) large automobile suppliers
and producers of consumer products; (2) public
transport companies (railways, metros and trolley
buses); (3) industrial producers of electrical
motors; (4) smaller customers and end users
of such electrical motors seeking replacement
parts; and (5) ‘‘cutters’’, third parties which
turn ‘‘blocks’’ into finished products for onward
sale.
Secondly, there appears to have been some dis-
pute about questions in a Commission request for
information, which according to the Commission
was ‘‘standard and purely factual’’ but which two
companies refused to answer. At least one of them
then provided answers, but only as part of its
leniency application.
Thirdly, Carbone Lorraine claimed that it
should have a reduction for ‘‘significant added
value’’ to the Commission’s case under para.21
of the 2002 Notice. The Commission rejected
this, considering that since Morgan Crucible had
applied under the 1996 Notice, only that Notice
applied and that a defendant could not ‘‘just select
elements more favourable to it under the later
Notice’’.94 (However, it may be noted that the
Commission has made analogies to para.23 of the
2002 Notice and granted reductions for specific
evidentiary contributions which have a direct
bearing on the duration or gravity of a suspected
cartel.)
Fourthly, the fine on SGL Carbon was reduced
by 33 per cent, taking into account that SGL was
‘‘both undergoing serious financial constraints
and has relatively recently been subject to
two significant fines’’ (¤80 million for graphite
electrodes in 2001; ¤27.5 million for speciality
graphites in 2002). In such circumstances the
Commission accepted that imposing the full
94. ibid., at [327].
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amount on the fine ‘‘does not appear necessary
to ensure effective deterrence’’.95
Organic Peroxides decision
In April 2005, the Commission published its 2003
decision in the Oxygen Peroxides cartel case.96
The case related to a 21-year cartel from 1971
to 1999, involving Akzo Nobel, Atofina, Peroxid
Chemie (orginally owned by Interox, then Laporte
Plc, then Degussa) and Peroxides Organicos,
known as ‘‘Perorsa’’ (originally part of Interox,
then owned by Laporte and FMC Forest—called
‘‘Laporte’’ here). The Swiss statistics consultancy
AC Treuhand was also found to have infringed
because of its role in the cartel. Another company,
Pergon, was implicated, but not ultimately found
to have infringed, because of limitation.
Organic peroxides are organic molecules con-
taining a ‘‘peroxy’’ ore ‘‘oxygen-oxy’’ bond. They
are highly explosive and come in various forms,
powders, liquids or pastels. They have three
main applications, in high polymers, unsaturated
polyester and as so-called ‘‘cross-linking’’ agents.
There are also some seven classes of product, so
the variations possible are many. For the purposes
of these proceedings, the Commission treated the
products as one relevant product market. Their use
is mainly in the plastics and rubber industries.
The Commission found that European produc-
ers of organic peroxides pursued anti-competitive
behaviour concerning the entire EEA mar-
ket, although there were more specific ‘‘sub-
arrangements’’ for some of the applications and
in certain countries (Spain, France and the United
Kingdom).97 Akzo was the leading supplier in
Europe, followed by Atochem and Laporte.
The market in Europe in 1999 (the last year
of the infringement) was found to be some ¤250
million. The infringement was considered to be
‘‘very serious’’. Atofina’s fine was some ¤43.47
million, Peroxid Chemie and Degussa (Laporte)
some ¤16.7 million, Peroxid Chemie (alone) ¤8.8
million, Perosa ¤0.5 million (and as noted AC
Treuhand was fined ¤1000.) Akzo obtained full
immunity on the first company in with decisive
evidence
Particularly interesting aspects of the case are
as follows:
First, the Commission decided to fine AC
Treuhand for its role as an organiser of the cartel.
AC Treuhand was formed after a management
buyout of the Swiss statistics firm, Fides, in 1993.
The Commission’s position is that AC Treu-
hand’s role went beyond that of a mere secretariat.
95. ibid., at [360].
96. [2005] O.J. L110/44; the non-confidential text is the
Commission’s website. It appears that since 2002 the
American authorities had also been investigating organic
peroxides.
97. ibid., at [37].
In this respect, the Commission noted that AC
Treuhand, among other things:
— held the original (cartel) agreement and key
data used for the cartel in Zurich on ‘‘pink’’
and ‘‘red’’ paper to distinguish them;
— at times ‘‘mediated’’ in cartel disputes;
— reimbursed travel expenses so that these did
not appear in company records.98
The Commission noted also that it had indicated
that the Commission would take such a position
before, in the 1980 Italian Flat Glass cartel.99
However, because of variations in approach since
then, the Commission treats its position here as
new, justifying only a symbolic fine of ¤1000.
Secondly, there is a lot of discussion in
the decision about whether there were several
separate infringements, or one infringement with
many aspects. Perorsa argued, notably, that the
Spanish ‘‘sub-arrangement’’ was in fact a separate
cartel, for which fines were time-barred, because
that cartel ended before the main agreement. The
Commission considered all the sub-arrangements
linked together, relying on case law emphasising
that a cartel may change in form over its
duration and denying such limitation claims. The
Commission follows its classic position of arguing
that the various practices were all part of an
‘‘overall plan or scheme’’ to distort competition
in the EEA organic peroxides market.1 This also
links together the practices in time, even though
the Commission may note that certain parts ended
at certain times.
Thirdly, who was first in was a close thing.2
Akzo gained that position and full immunity, but
only just, with Atochem only a few weeks behind.
It appears both had opening conversations with
the Commission, confirmed in writing afterwards,
but Akzo was first in with a detailed statement
with ‘‘numerous annexes’’. This shows again the
importance of submitting documentary evidence
fast in leniency applications.
Fourthly, Atochem benefited from a huge
reduction in fine for its evidentiary contribution
outside the 1996 leniency notice: ¤94.19 million.3
The Commission’s reasoning is that Atochem’s
position on the evidence in 1992 was key in
proving the full duration of the infringement. This
was because there was some debate as to whether
one cartel stopped that year and another started
again later. Without it, the Commission would
likely have only found an infringement of six and
a half years (against 29 for some!). The reduction
98. ibid., at [91]–[105], [331] et seq.
99. ibid., at [348].
1. ibid., at [315], [320].
2. ibid., at [56]–[60].
3. ibid., at [493]–[495].
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corresponds to the additional fine on Atochem for
those extra years.
Fifthly, beyond the more classic cartel
behaviour, designed to stabilise market share, co-
ordinate price increases and allocate customers,
the participants also admitted and the Commis-
sion found that the participants had agreed to buy
up certain potentially disruptive competitors (and
did so).4
Finally, given the long duration for some (29
years), fine duration increases were huge: e.g. 245
per cent for Akzo and Atochem, 207.5 per cent
for Peroxid Chemie and 220 per cent for Perosa.
Interestingly, the Commission gave 10 per cent
per year increases for the 20 years pre-1999 and
5 per cent for earlier than that, considering that
competition policy then was less strict, companies
were less aware of the rules and fines were lower.5
Industrial Tubes decision
The Commission has now published its 2003
decision in this case.6 It may be recalled that the
Commission imposed fines of some ¤79 million
on three groups of companies, KME, Outokumpu
and Wieland Werke. The Commission found that,
around a quality association for air conditioning
and refrigeration tubes called Cuproclima, the
companies had co-ordinated on prices and
allocated market shares in the EEA market for
industrial copper tubes from 1988 until early
2001. The EEA market was found to be some
¤288 million in 2000.
The Commission found that the infringement
was ‘‘very serious’’. The KME group was fined
some ¤39.8 million, Wieland Werke some ¤20.7
million and Outokumpu some ¤18.1 million.
Outokumpu’s fine included an increase of 50 per
cent for deterrence and 50 per cent for recidivism,
the Commission noting that Outokumpu had been
the addressee of a previous decision under the
ECSC Treaty which it considered of the same type.
(This is under appeal, since Outokumpu considers
that the earlier steel case involved a very-different,
public context.7)
There are two main points of particular interest:
First, Outokumpu’s fine was reduced by a lump
sum of some ¤22 million, for co-operation outside
the 1996 Leniency Notice (in addition to a 50 per
cent leniency reduction for co-operation), in so
far as Outokumpu was the first to give evidence
that the duration of the infringement was some 12
years rather than four years.8 Outokumpu’s fine
was therefore adjusted to what it would have had
4. ibid., at [271]–[273] and [353] et seq.
5. ibid., at [466].
6. Non-confidential version on the Commission’s web-
site.
7. Industrial Tubes, ibid., at [349].
8. ibid., at [384]–[387].
for a four-year infringement. The Commission’s
approach here was overtly similar to that in
the 2002 Leniency Notice, para.23, and aimed to
ensure that Outokumpu should not be penalised
for its co-operation with a higher fine than it would
have had to pay without the co-operation.
Secondly, the question as to whether the fines
should relate to the full tube turnover of the
companies, or only the value of the conversion
work which the companies did, transforming
copper into the products concerned. Notably, in
so far as customers fixed the metal values first,
based on the prevailing price on the London Metal
Exchange, so that the companies’ co-ordination
focused on their prices for ‘‘conversion work’’.9
Needles decision
The Commission has now published its 2004
decision on the needles and haberdashery cartel.10
In that decision the Commission fined two
companies, Coats and Prym, ¤30 million each.
Entaco received 100 per cent immunity from
fines under the 1996 Leniency Notice as the
first company providing decisive evidence of the
cartel. The European ‘‘hard haberdashery’’ market
was found to be worth some ¤1.5 billion and the
two other more specific markets affected here, ¤30
million each.
The Commission found that the three com-
panies entered into a series of bilateral written
agreements amounting, in practice, to a tripartite
agreement under which they shared product mar-
kets and geographic markets. More specifically,
the Commission found that between 1994 and
1999, among other things, Prym and Entaco had
agreed:
— to limit the business activity of Entaco
to the handsewing and special needles
business (and therefore not other types of
haberdashery);
— to limit Entaco’s activity in the needles mar-
ket to the United Kingdom, Ireland and to
some extent Italy (with an exception for cer-
tain ‘‘accounts’’), effectively reserving the
Continental European market for needles to
Prym.
Coats was also found:
— to have protected its own retail needle
brand, Milward, from competition by enter-
ing into an exclusive supply and purchasing
agreement with Entaco which covered the
9. This is under appeal.
10. The non-confidential version is available on the
Commission’s website. With thanks to Stefano Fratta for
his assistance with this and comments on other cases; see
also Roques (Spring 2005) EC Commission Competition
Policy Newsletter 59–61.
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United Kingdom and partially Italy (effec-
tively preventing Entaco from selling other
branded needles there);
— to have imposed on Entaco the obligation
to respect the geographic market-sharing
agreement between Coats and Prym.
The Commission found that these agreements
were inter-conditional (the Commission quotes
several clauses to that effect).
It appears that Coats and Prym had co-operated
for a number of years across Europe in the
distribution of haberdashery. In 1991 Coats sold
part of its needles business to Entaco in a
management buyout. These agreements were then
developed, partly to have Entaco fit into the
scheme, partly so that the newly independent
Entaco did not undermine the business of Coats
and partly so that Entaco secured its business
platform (with committed purchasing from Coats
and protection from Prym competition). Later on,
the agreements broke down, with Prym supplying
Coats more. Entaco then offered to sell itself to
Prym, but Prym did not pursue the possibility. A
little later Entaco approached the Commission.
There are five particular aspects to the case.
— First, this is not a simple classic cartel.
The unlawful co-operation is built up from
several bilateral agreements (together with a
number of bilateral and tripartite meetings).
— Secondly, Coats was not operating at the
same level as Prym and Entaco in the nee-
dles concerned. Rather Coats, after it sold
the relevant needle production business to
Entaco in 1991, was only a distributor of
such products. (The Commission noted that
Coats dominated the distribution of needles
and pins across Europe.) Nevertheless, the
Commission found Coats to have been fully
implicated in the unlawful arrangements.11
— Thirdly, the Commission found that the
exclusive supply and purchasing agree-
ment between Coats and Entaco could not
come under the then applicable exclusive
distribution block exemption (Regulation
1983/83), because the agreement was in fact
tripartite and required Entaco to respect
a non-exempt restriction, namely market-
sharing with Prym.
— Fourthly, the Commission also stated that
the specialisation block exemption could
not apply because the market shares of
Entaco and Prym were too high for the
applicable thresholds.
— Finally, one may note that this is yet another
example of the antitrust complexities which
can arise when companies are sold out of a
11. Needles case, ibid., at [274].
group, but still closely related or dependent
on the group concerned for their ongoing
business.
Plasterboard decision
In June 2005, the Commission published its 2002
decision in the Plasterboard case.12
The Commission found that four companies,
BPB, Knauf Westdeutsche Gipswerke, Lafarge and
Gyprox Benelux had participated in a price-fixing
and market sharing cartel between 1992 to 1998,
designed to stabilise the four principal markets
for plasterboard in the EU, namely Germany, the
United Kingdom, France, and Benelux.
The value of the plasterboard market in the
countries concerned in 1998, the last year of the
infringement was some ¤1,200 million. BPB’s fine
was increased by 50 per cent for recidivism in
so far as its subsidiary BPB De Eendracht had
been involved in the cartonboard cartel. Similarly,
Lafarge’s fine was increased by 50 per cent because
of its previous infringement in the cement cartel.
The final amounts were: Lafarge ¤249.6 million,
BPB ¤138.6 million, Knauf ¤85.8 million, Gyproc
¤4.32 million.
It appears that after BPB acquired a company
called Rigips in Germany in 1987, radical changes
occurred in the European market, with the largest
producers buying up many of the smaller ones
to the point where an oligopolistic structure
was created with BPB, Knauf and Lafarge the
main players and Gyproc and Norgips minor
ones. There are also a number of cross-holdings
in the industry. There was then a price war
and intense competition on volumes. From 1992
BPB and Knauf started an information exchange
system, which Lafarge and Gyproc joined. There
were also exchanges of information on prices in
the United Kingdom and Germany and meetings
which the Commission found were with a view to
‘‘stabilising’’ the German market.
The companies concerned argued, among
other things, that their contacts were essentially
designed to create statistical information which
was not otherwise available, contested that their
actions were unlawful and argued that the contacts
had little market impact. Much of this appears to
relate to the fact that contacts were often at a
high level (in terms of people and information
exchanged) rather than with the rank and file and
in great detail.
Particular noteworthy points in the decision
are:
First, the Commission considered that, on
the contrary, there were clear discussions and
meetings and market effects and that the contacts
12. [2005] O.J. L166/8. The non-confidential version is
on the Commission’s website.
[2006] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 2  SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
60 RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2004–2005 (PART 1): [2006] I.C.C.L.R.
could not be assimilated to legitimate statistical
exchange when they included ‘‘secret’’ mail
and/or faxes to the private homes of executives
involved.13
Secondly, that Gyproc was given a lesser fine
in part because of the role BPB on its activities.
BPB was a significant minority shareholder, held
the Gyproc trade mark and sat on the board of
Gyproc. It appears that one of the BPB directors
in Gyproc passed on information concerning its
activities. This did not amount to a defence or a
finding of ‘‘passive participation’’ for Gyproc, but
it was treated as mitigation.14
Thirdly, the way that the Commission’s deci-
sion on information data exchanges is based in
part on the oligopolistic nature of the market and
on the Tractor Exchange case.15 In other words,
that in the market circumstances, even if there
was only an exchange of information, that was an
infringement.
Sorbates decision
In July 2005, the Commission published its
decision in the 2003 Sorbates cartel.16 Sor-
bates are chemical preservatives (anti-microbial
agents), capable of retarding the growth of micro-
organisms such as yeast, bacteria, moulds or
fungi and are used primarily in food and bever-
ages. They are also used as stabilisers in other
products, such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics,
pet food and animal feed. The relevant geo-
graphic market was found to be worldwide in
scope.
The cartel concerned European and Japanese
companies: Hoechst, Daicel Chemical, Chisso
Corp, Nippon Synthetic Chemical and Ueno Fine
Chemicals. These companies were found to have
agreed on price targets and allocated volume
quotas.17 An unusual feature of the case was
on agreed policy not to give sorbates technology
to potential new entrants.18 The arrangements
were found to have lasted from December 1978
until November 1995/October 1996, i.e. for some
17–18 years.
Hoechst and Daicel were considered to be the
leaders of the cartel, Hoechst being the largest
worldwide producer and Daicel arranging related
co-ordination meetings of the Japanese producers.
The Commission considered the infringement
‘‘very serious’’. The Commission weighted the
starting amounts based on worldwide turnover in
the last year of the infringement, 1995. Hoechst’s
13. ibid., at [162]–[164].
14. ibid., at [574].
15. ibid., at [449]–[450] and [535]; Case C–7/95P; John
Deere v Commission [1998] E.C.R. I–3111.
16. [2005] O.J. L182/20. The non-confidential version of
the decision is on the Commission’s website.
17. ibid., at [264]–[281].
18. ibid., at [117].
fine was increased by 100 per cent for deterrence.
Given the duration, the increases on that account
were significant, mainly 175 per cent and in
one case 165 per cent. Hoechst’s fine was also
increased 50 per cent for recidivism and 30
per cent for its leading role in the cartel, with
Daicel also having a 30 per cent fine increase
for its leading role. Total fines were ¤137.8
million. Hoechst’s fine was ¤99 million, Daicel
¤16 million, Ueno ¤12.3 and Nippon ¤10.5
million.
The main points of particular interest in the
case were the following:
First, there was some dispute about which
company came in first. One company, Chiasso,
came to the Commission in September 1998.
Another, Hoechst/Nutrinova then came in October
1998, giving a description of the cartel’s activities.
Then in November, Chiasso gave another oral
description and documentary evidence.
The Commission found that Chiasso was
the first to produce decisive evidence (and
therefore qualify for 100 per cent immunity
if the other conditions of the 1996 Leniency
Notice were met). Hoechst disagreed, but this
was rejected by the Commission, which found
that Hoechst’s October contribution had not been
precise, detailed or reliable enough.19 The key
point was that the oral description of the cartel
here was not treated as decisive evidence.20 (The
Commission also found that Hoechst had played
a ‘‘determining role’’ in the cartel and therefore
could not qualify for 100 per cent leniency on that
account.)
This makes interesting reading for those
following the debate as to whether decisive
evidence should be required or just a US style
‘‘marker’’ to qualify for immunity.
Secondly, there appear to have been some
delays in the EU procedure, while the compa-
nies concerned dealt with parallel US criminal
issues.21 For example, some requests for informa-
tion in May 1999 were not answered until 2001
or even 2002.22 Written submissions were also
delayed so as not to be discoverable prior to poten-
tial US prosecution.23 The Commission appears to
have also treated such delay as indicative of a lack
of continuous co-operation.24
Thirdly, unusually the Commission gave one
company, Ueno a reduction on the basis that it had
shown that it did not implement the volume quota
19. ibid., at [443].
20. ibid., at [444].
21. In the United States, five producers pleaded guilty
to price fixing and other fines of some US$132 million.
Fines were also imposed in Canada.
22. See non-confidential decision, fn.16 (2nd ser.)
above, at [6], [9], [10].
23. ibid., at [441].
24. ibid., at [447]–[449].
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allocations.25 Often such arguments are rejected
as mere ‘‘cartel cheating’’, but here Ueno showed
that it more than doubled its volume quota in its
European sales since 1991.
Fine Art Auction Houses decision
In July 2005, the Commission published its 2002
decision in this case.26 The Commission found
that, between April 1993 and February 2000,
Christies and Sothebys, the world’s leading fine
arts auction houses for fine art objects, antiques,
furniture ‘‘collectibles’’ and memorabilia, had
agreed, among other things, to adopt identical
commission structures for vendors, to increase
vendor commission charges and to refrain from
offering special conditions to sellers. They also
co-operated on conditions applicable to buyers.
It appears that the co-operation developed
during a recession, in which the houses had been
offering all sorts of advantages to sellers, including
0 per cent commission in order to obtain business,
leaving the auction house income as only from a
premium paid by buyers.
The Commission found that there were two
main phases: first, a ‘‘grand plan’’ agreement in
1993, with some implementation on terms and
conditions and then, in 1995, a more specific step
of introducing new and stricter rules on vendor’s
commissions, from which it was agreed not to
deviate, except for agreed ‘‘grandfather lists’’ of
pre-existing agreements.
Christies was granted a 100 per cent reduction
in fine, since it informed the Commission first.
Sothebys also co-operated with the Commission
and received a 40 per cent fine reduction under
the Leniency Notice, meaning that its fine was
¤20.4 million.
French Beer decision
In July 2005, the Commission published its
decision in the Danone/Kronenbourg Heineken
cartel case.27 It may be recalled that this was
a somewhat unusual case in which these two
companies had entered into a so-called ‘‘armistice
agreement’’, agreeing not to purchase more drinks
wholesalers, to ‘‘balance’’ the total volume of
beer distributed through the two networks and
to balance the volume of each other’s beer brands
distributed by the other party. The case arose as a
result of information from Interbrew, which is the
main importer of beer into France.
The focus of the Commission’s case was the
agreement itself, entered into in March 1996,
25. ibid., at [404]–406].
26. [2005] O.J. L200/92; the non-confidential text of the
decision is on the Commission’s website.
27. [2005] O.J. L184/57. The non-confidential text is on
the Commission’s website. See also, Rutgeerts (Spring
2005) EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter
63–64.
with the Commission openly stating that it did
not have evidence of implementation (as Danone
and Heineken continued to buy wholesalers and
supplanted their competitors’ beer in their own
distribution networks).28 This was therefore a case
based on ‘‘object’’, rather than effect, although
the Commission found an effect on trade through
the way that the agreed structure could affect
the conditions of access for third parties such as
Interbrew, to the French market. The ultimate fine
on Danone/Kronenbourg was ¤1.5 million and on
Heineken ¤1 million.
There are three main points of interest:
First, the Commission decided that the infringe-
ment was only ‘‘serious’’. The Commission found
that the armistice agreement was not as serious as
a price-fixing agreement:
‘‘an agreement designed to bring wholesaler acquisi-
tion costs under control in the short term by putting
an end to an acquisition war cannot be regarded
as a clear infringement on a par with a price-fixing
agreement’’.29
Although the Commission found that the agree-
ment on equilibrium between the two distribution
networks was akin to a market-sharing agreement,
the agreement was also found not to be market-
sharing in the ‘‘conventional’’ sense, ‘‘since the
agreement was intended mainly to prevent one
group from dominating the market’’ (rather than
to eliminate all competition between the groups
or impede third parties).30 Otherwise, the Com-
mission noted that the agreement was not imple-
mented and related only to the ‘‘away from home’’
sales of drinks in France (found to be less than
one-third of the national sales volume).
Secondly, Danone’s fine was still increased by
50 per cent for recidivism because it was involved
in market-sharing agreements in the Benelux Flat
Glass case in 1984 (through BSN).31 However, the
Commission did not take into account Danone’s
infringement in the Glass Containers case in
1974 on the basis that the case, mainly involved
price-fixing.32 In other words, the Commission
distinguished between different types of cartel,
in determining what was an infringement ‘‘of the
same type’’ under the Fining Guidelines.
Thirdly, there were no reductions for leniency
because there were no applications, although the
companies had co-operated with the Commission.
No reductions were given for not challenging the
facts, since that is not available under the 2002
Leniency Notice which applied.33
28. ibid., at [48].
29. ibid., at [83].
30. ibid., at [83].
31. ibid., at [91].
32. ibid., at [91], fn.93.
33. ibid., at [101].
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Copper Plumbing Tubes decision
The Commission has now published its 2004
decision in this case.34 It may be recalled that
the Commission imposed fines of some ¤222.3
million on seven groups/companies: KME, IMI,
Boliden, Outokumpu, Wieland, Halcor and HME
Nederland. Mueller Industries was also found to
have infringed, but given full immunity.
The Commission found that the companies
had been involved (to differing extents) in price-
fixing and market sharing in the EEA for varying
periods from 1988 until March 2001. The products
concerned are generally used for water, oil, gas
and heating installations in the construction
industry. The overall market, taking together
plain, insulated or plastic coated tubes was found
to be worth some ¤1.15 billion in 2000. The
Commission found that the infringement was
‘‘very serious’’. Fines ranged from some ¤67
million on the KME group to ¤4.4 on HME
Nederland BV.
Particular features of the case are as follows:
First, the way that the Commission found a
‘‘single, continuous, complex’’ (and, as regards
certain companies) ‘‘multiform’’ infringement.35
In doing so the Commission treated co-ordination
among (1) users of the Sanco trade mark for plain
copper tubes; (2) users of the WICU/Cuprothem
trade mark for plastic-coated tubes; and (3) other
market participants as all part of one infringement,
even though not all companies were involved in
all these activities or made the same types of
products.
Secondly, as in the Industrial Tubes case there
is debate as to whether fines should be based on
total product turnover or distinguish ‘‘conversion
work’’ from the underlying copper which was
made into the products concerned. Outokumpu
34. Non-confidential version on the Commission’s
website. See also Mische (Spring 2005) EC Commission
Competition Policy Newsletter 67–70.
35. Copper Plumbing Tubes, ibid., at [458].
was also considered to be recidivist on the basis of
an ECSC decision (which Outokumpu contested,
among other things, on the basis that the earlier
case was in a very different situation in a quasi-
public content and Outokumpu was acting under
government influence in a trade context).36
Thirdly, Halcor pleaded that it had been
coerced into the arrangements. This was not
accepted by the Commission.37
Fourthly, Outokumpu’s fine was reduced by
a lump sum of ¤40.17 million, for co-operation
outside the 1996 Leniency Notice, in so far
as Outokumpu disclosed the whole duration of
the cartel. KME was also granted a reduction
of ¤7.93 million in its fine outside leniency
co-operation, for its evidentiary contribution as
regards the WICU/Cuprotherm arrangements. The
Commission’s reasoning is that reductions should
be granted by analogy with the later 2002 Notice,
which provides for such a consideration, even
though this case was under the 1996 Notice.38
In Part 2, to be published in the next journal,
John Ratliff will outline:
• Other European Commission cases on horizontal
co-operation and distribution
• Proposed ‘‘commitment decisions’’ for diamond
supply and collecting society licensing
• ECN developments
• New sectoral reviews into energy, payment
cards and insurance
• Interesting Art.82 EC cases on clearing and
settlement of securities and predatory pricing
in ADSL internet services
• Policy discussion on cartel plea-bargaining
 JOHN RATLIFF, 2006
36. ibid., at [721]. The case is on appeal.
37. Paras 534 et seq.
38. See, Mische, fn.34 (2nd ser.) above, p. 69 and
Decision paras 757–761.
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